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DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND PILLS—A SYSTEM POPPING UNDER TOO MUCH PHYSICIAN
DISCRETION? A LAW-POLICY PRESCRIPTION TO MAKE DRUG APPROVAL MORE
MEANINGFUL IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE
Michael J. Malinowski*

ABSTRACT
This article challenges the scope of physician discretion to engage in off-label use
of prescription drugs. The discretion to prescribe dimensions beyond the clinical
research that puts new drugs on pharmacy shelves has been shaped by two historic
influences: a legacy of physician paternalism, solidarity, autonomy, and selfdetermination that predates the contemporary commercialization of medicine by more
than half a century, and regulatory necessity due to the limits of science and innate
crudeness of pharmaceuticals prior to the genomics revolution (drug development and
delivery based upon genetic expression). Although both factors have changed
immensely, the standard for drug approval has lingered. This article proposes that doctor
discretion to prescribe off label must be modified and the regulatory standard for new
drug approvals raised given the proliferation of adverse events, drug ineffectiveness, the
need to make choices among treatment options under time pressures, the increasing
complexity of biopharmaceuticals, health care cost pressures, and the vulnerability of
patients—seekers of health care, not research subjects protected under the scrutiny of
regulations to protect human subjects. The article concludes that, although some
physician discretion to prescribe off label still is necessary, law-policy reforms to shift
more of the drug discovery process from the clinical care of patients to clinical research
in drug development are long overdue. Proposals to accomplish this, drawn from recent
legislation and ongoing health care reform, include heightening the regulatory standards
for new drug approvals and drug reimbursement.
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1960-19701
The United States Senate held hearings in January 1970 to address widespread
adverse events, including stokes and deaths, associated with the birth control pill—
which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had approved for market use nearly
a decade before. At the time, the pill was being taken by approximately six million
women annually, with consumption rising rapidly.2 Although the issue was serious
health risks to women and for a medication taken solely by women, only men were
allowed to testify. As explained by Dr. Philip Ball,
It was an enormous room, full of people. Well, I simply told them that I was in
1

The following was transcribed by the author from The Pill (PBS Home Video, 2003).
This testimony was inspired in part by BARBARA SEAMAN, THE DOCTORS’ CASE AGAINST THE Pill
(1969). In spite of this experience with the pill, estrogen was aggressively prescribed to postmenopausal
women without attention to cancer risks until the late 1990s. As explained by Dr. Groopman,
The growth in prescriptions of estrogen for postmenopausal women can be traced to a bestseller published
in the 1960s, Feminine Forever, by Dr. Robert A. Wilson. It turned out that a drug company that made
estrogen had paid Dr. Wilson to write the book. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 210 (2008).
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practice, and that I was suddenly afflicted by all these young women taking the
pill that had all these problems . . . . . Mind you, the dose of the pill in those days
was ten times what it is now. It was a huge blockbuster pill they used as a
sledgehammer to drive a small nail. You know, it was an unnecessary dose.
A group of young feminists who themselves had taken the pill attended the
hearings. According to advocate Alice Wolfson, a leader within the group,
We began to hear researcher after researcher, male after male, start saying things
about the pill, and then one doctor I believe said “Fertilizer is to weed what
estrogen is to cancer . . . . .” It just all seemed so outrageous to us that we were
not given any information when we were given the pill. It was literally handed
out like candy.
A protest erupted, which captured more media attention than the hearings it
disrupted. As a result, hormone levels in the pill were slashed, the occurrence of side
effects greatly diminished, and the FDA required manufacturers to include information in
every package listing potential risks. The most significant change was that women
demanded a new kind of relationship with their doctors. As reflected upon by Dr.
Richard Hauskenecht:
The bad patient, she’d walk in pregnant with the husband and “Here are my
demands”—that was a phenomena of the 70s. “I won’t have this, I will have
that, and I won’t have this,” and they got this from the same medical political
activist that I was. And it was terrifying to me to hear myself give a lecture to a
lay group about why they should not let doctors do all these things to them, and
those same damn patients came back to my office and made those demands of me,
and it used to upset the hell out of me.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The roles of physician and patient have changed immensely in the U.S. over the
decades since the 1970 U.S. Senate hearings on the pill. The “silent world of doctor and
patient”3 at the time of the hearings still lingers to some extent today,4 but medicine has
been commercialized and the medical profession has lost a considerable amount of its
autonomy, solidarity, and self-determination. Factors that have drained the sovereignty
of the medical profession include increasing dependence on outside institutions (hospitals
and government regulators, for example) in conjunction with the progressive
sophistication of the practice of medicine, the commercialization of medicine, the rise of
consumer-driven medicine in an internet age, aggressive direct-to-consumer marketing by
the biopharmaceutical sectors which encourages patients to make drug demands on their
3

See generally Jay Katz : JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (discussing a
“millennia of Hypocratic paternalism”).
4
See Susan M. Wolf, Doctor and Patient: An Unfinished Revolution, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. &
Ethics 485, 485-500 (2006). Cf. GROOPMAN, supra note 2.
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physicians, legislation that enables patients to check and control the flow of their medical
information, and public and political challenges to the entire health care system with
ongoing, sweeping federal and state reforms underway.5 Similarly, in many ways today’s
FDA is fundamentally different from the agency that put the pill on the market in 1960.
The FDA’s very mission has changed from policing safety and efficacy with a
presumption in favor of caution. Since modernization of the FDA in 1997, the agency is
under a mandate to achieve review efficiency through increased responsiveness to
industry during the drug approval process,6 and there is a presumption to put drugs on the
market on a wait-and-see basis—which is what happened with Vioxx.7 More than 900
FDA reviewers are salaried through the collection of user fees from the sponsors of the
new drugs they regulate.8
In spite of these changes, the fundamental law-policy governing drug approval
and delivery remains vested in the past. Specifically, this article questions broad
physician discretion to prescribe pharmaceuticals off label. Too much reliance is placed
on the medical profession to develop meaningful understanding of pharmaceuticals after
they are on the market, one patient at a time, especially in an age of unprecedented
science precision through advances in human genetics.9 The discussion centers on the
5

See generally Symposium—Patient-Centered Law and Ethics, 45 WAKE FOREST 1429 (2010);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HEALTH REFORM: PROSPERING IN A POST-REFORM WORLD (2010)
[hereinafter “PWC REPORT”]. DAVID GRATZER, THE CURE, at xvi (“Between 2000 and 2006, health costs
have soared and health insurance premiums have roughly doubled. It’s not simply employers who feel the
pinch. Consider a family’s perspective. . . . In fact, since the early 1970s, health spending per capita has
increased fivefold, adjusting for inflation.”). The employer cost of health insurance has been soaring:
Employers during the Bush years paid handsomely for labor. In fact, employers’ costs for employing a
typical, median worker jumped from $19.85 per hour in 200 to $25.67 in 2006. That’s a raise of more
than $5 per hour, or 25%.
Yet the average worker saw none of the money. Every dime—and then some—was gobbled up by
the rising cost of employer provided health insurance . . . .
Look at this from the point of view of some typical American family. Married, two kids.
Between 2000 and 2006, their pay has barely gone up at all. They’ve had a nice little tax cut from the
Bush Administration, worth perhaps $500. But they’re paying $1,100 more per year in out-of-pocket
health care costs.Id. at xvi, quoting DAVID FRUM, COMEBACK:CONSERVATISM THAT CAN WIN AGAIN
(2009).
6
See Christopher D. Zalesky, Considering Changes to CMS’s National Coverage Decision Process:
Applying Lessons Learned From FDA as a Regulator of Access to Healthcare Technology, 57 FOOD &
DRUG L. J. 73, 74-75 (2002).
7
See generally W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it have Ended Differently in the European
Union?, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 365 (2006) [hereinafter “Vioxx Story”]; MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT
DRUG COMPANIES (2004).
8
See generally FDA, Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/default.htm (last visited July 31,
2011); Dep. Health & Human Serv’s, Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for 2012, available at
http://www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/OFRData/2011-19332_PI.pdf (last visited July 31, 2011). See generally
James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration
Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 261 (2005).
9
As explained by one commentator,
Once a drug is approved, however, the FDA cannot control how physicians actually prescribe it.
Physicians can prescribe any drug for any medical condition, even outside of the parameters of the
label, for a so-called “off-label” use. Therefore, off-label use is the prescription of a
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changed status of the medical profession and surrounding circumstances since the offlabel norms were established last century.
The article begins with discussion of how the broad discretion to prescribe
dimensions beyond the clinical research that puts new drugs on pharmacy shelves is the
product of two historic influences. The first is a legacy of paternalism and tremendous
physician autonomy that predates the contemporary commercialization of medicine, and
the second is regulatory necessity due to the limits of science and innate crudeness of
pharmaceuticals prior to the genomics revolution (drug development and delivery based
upon genetic expression). Although these norms have changed immensely over the last
several decades, the standard for drug approval remains vested in the past.
Part III addresses the state of drug delivery and development today—a problem of
over delivery of prescription pharmaceuticals off-label by physicians that is no longer
supported in our health care system. The article discusses the history of the authority of
the AMA over health care and the pharmaceutical marketplace, and how the AMA’s role
has changed, making its broad discretion to prescribe off label antiquated and
questionable. Excessive off-label prescribing detracts from patient care directly and
through its impact on drug development.
The article concludes that doctor discretion to prescribe off label must be
modified to improve human health and drug development. Law-policy proposals are put
forth to shift drug discovery from doctor offices to the clinical research that puts them on
pharmacy shelves.
II.

THE BACKSTORY TO CONTEMPORARY OFF-LABEL USE: AUTONOMY,
PATERNALISM, AND THE LIMITS OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT

Expansive physician discretion to prescribe beyond the clinical research that puts new
drugs on the market is reflective of two historic influences, each of which is addressed
below. The first is a legacy of physician paternalism, self-determination, and autonomy
that predates the contemporary commercialization of medicine. The second is regulatory
necessity attributable to the limits of science and innate crudeness of most
pharmaceuticals prior to the genomics revolution.
A. PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY, SELF-DETERMINATION, AND PATERNALISM
The medical profession’s response to the television series Marcus Welby, MD, which
aired from 1968 to 1976 and was the biggest hit in ABC’s history at the time,10
exemplifies the autonomy, solidarity, and PATERNALISM the AMA enjoyed prior to
pharmaceutical product at a dose and/or for a condition that the FDA has either not reviewed or
not approved. Off-label uses of drugs are commonplace. For example, most drugs historically
were tested and approved for use in adults; therefore, physicians who wanted to treat similar
indications in pediatric patients by definition had to use the drugs off-label.
Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals and
Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 n.114 (2011).
10
JOSEPH TUROW, PLAYING DOCTOR: TELEVISION, STORYTELLING, & MEDICAL POWER 143 (2010).
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changes that began in the 1970s. The show portrayed Dr. Marcus Welby, the
consummate family doctor, and his young assistant, Dr. Steven Kiley, played by James
Brolin. The two were responsive to PATIENTS as individuals, and they worked to
humanize medicine against a system of formality and specialization that promoted too
many uncaring doctors.
The physician community responded loudly and defensively to the television series.
They complained “that millions of Americans were becoming resentful of their
physicians for not living up to the image of the wise and caring physician” and that the
show was stirring up medical malpractice actions.11 The debate that ensued, set in the
age of television with heavy national viewership, was the first time that the physician
establishment engaged in a large-scale public debate over whether patient positive
fictional depictions of doctors detracted from their status, and it generated extensive
coverage—including articles in The New York Times Magazine and McCall’s that
received much attention and fueled the controversy.12 Robert Young, the actor who
played Dr. Welby, took on a group of family physicians personally at a large national
convention:
Robert Young went even so far as to chide physicians publicly for not living up to
his Welby image. At one convention of family physicians, for example, a doctor
said to Young, “You’re getting us all into hot water. Our patients keep telling us
we’re not as nice to them as Doctor Welby is to his patients.” Young didn’t
mince words. “Maybe you’re not,” he said.13
Public and professional reactions to Marcus Welby, MD and the Senate hearings
and controversy over the pill are two illustrations of how the 1970s was a period of
transition for the doctor-patient relationship. Paul Starr, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for
general nonfiction for the Social Transformation of American Medicine, recognized the
same in 1984—years prior to proliferation of the managed care movement that he
predicted,14 and the commercialization and national health care reform eras that have
followed:15
When I began work in 1974, it was widely thought that medical schools, planners,
and administrators were emerging as the chief counterweight to private
physicians. Government seemed to be assuming a major, perhaps dominant role
in the organization of medical care. Decisions that had formally been private and
professional were becoming public and political. Eight years later this is no
longer clearly the direction of change, but neither is the status quo ante being
restored. Private corporations are gaining a more powerful position in American
medicine; if leading members of the Reagan administration have their way, the
future may well belong to corporate medicine. . . . Precisely because of what is
now taking place, it has become more necessary to understand medicine as a
11

Id. at 170.
Id.. Henry Enrich, The Nice Men Cometh, MCCALL’S MAG.23 (May 1972).
13
TUROW, PLAYING DOCTOR, supra note 10, at 143.
14
See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and a New Era in
Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331 (1996).
15
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE ix-x (1982).
12
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business as well as a cultural phenomenon—and perhaps most important, to
understand the relation between the two.
The current level of discretion physicians have over drug delivery, the focus of
this article, is rooted in the medical profession’s autonomous, self-determining past. An
element of physician authority is innate: The delivery of patient care is necessarily
individualized,16 and “The sick are ordinarily not the best judge of their own needs, nor
are those who are emotionally close to them.”17 However, the U.S. medical profession’s
story throughout the 20th century is exceptional: “Hardly anywhere have doctors been as
successful as American physicians in resisting national insurance and maintaining a
predominantly private and voluntary financing system.”18 The U.S. physician
community has been at least as effective creating direct returns for itself:19
The profession has been able to turn its authority into social privilege, economic
power, and political influence. . . . Until recently, it has exercised dominant
control over the markets and organizations in medicine that affect its interests. . . .
At all these levels, from individual relations to the state, the pattern has been one
of professional sovereignty.
A major factor unique to the U.S. is the political influence of the bond between
medicine and science—which cannot be underestimated in such a forward-looking nation
that has and continues to invest so much government and private funding in biomedical
research.20 Specifically, the medical profession has enjoyed “an especially persuasive
claim to authority. Unlike the law and the clergy, it enjoys close bonds with modern
science, and at least for most of the last century, scientific knowledge has held a
privileged status in the hierarchy of belief.”21 In fact, the rise of the influence and
autonomy of the American medical profession correlates with the organization and
formalization of medical education at the turn of the 20th century—starting with the
introduction of a four-year graduate program with a clinical teaching hospital component
by Johns Hopkins University in 1893.22 Harvard University soon followed, other
universities were inspired to do the same, and states funded programs to increase their
16

See Michael J. Malinowski & Grant G. Gautreaux, Drug Development—Stuck in a State of Puberty?
Regulatory Reform of Human Clinical Research to Raise Responsiveness to the Reality of Human
Variability, __ ST. LOUIS L. REV. __, __ (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter “Drug Puberty?’].
17
STARR, supra note 15, at 5.
18
Id. at 6.
19
Id. at 5.
20
PhRMA, 2010 REPORT IV (2011). Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at Part
III.A.; Owen C.B. Hughes, Alan L. Jakimo, & Michael J. Malinowski, United States Regulation of Stem
Cell Research: Recasting Government’s Role and Questions to be Resolved, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 386401 (2009). See general Malinowski, Discourse: A Law-Policy Proposal to Promote the Public Nature of
Science in an Era of Academia-Industry Integration, in BIENNIAL REVIEW OF LAW, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY: SCIENCE GOVERNANCE, FREEDOM OF RESEARCH, AND PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (2009).
21
STARR, supra note 15, at 4. Malinowski, Discourse, supra note 20, at II.A.
22
STARR, supra note 15, at 115-116. Johns Hopkins University took the lead in U.S. medical education by
opening its medical school in 1893—a 4-year program and requirement that all applications enter with
college degrees. Id. See generally ALAN M. CHESNEY, THE JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL AND THE JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, VOL. 1, EARLY YEARS, 1867-1893 (1943).
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populations’ access to quality medical care through education and teaching hospitals.23 A
population of physicians with graduate medical degree credentials was established, and
they called for and helped to implement and enforce licensing requirements and other
standards for the practice of medicine.24 “In the twentieth century, not only did
physicians become a powerful, prestigious, and wealthy profession, but they succeeded in
shaping the basic organization and financial structure of American medicine.”25
The medical profession managed to hold control over the practice of medicine and
block outside interests, government and corporate, from 1900 until 1930.26 Solo private
practitioners, the majority of physicians during this time, wanted to keep their
relationships with their patients unimpeded.27 However, the Great Depression launched
the gradual infusion of outside organizations and entities into the private practice of
medicine—namely hospitals, government regulators, insurers, pharmaceutical companies,
and other corporate interests.28 The paradox the American medical profession has faced
over its status is that its authority has risen in conjunction with therapeutic competence
enabled through science and technology, but the infusion of science and technology has
raised the need for capital investment and dependence on organizations such as hospitals,
pharmaceutical companies and, more recently, commercial health care networks.29 “In
2009, America’s pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies continued to
make the world’s largest investment in pharmaceutical R&D, holding steady with $65.3
billion spent on R&D, including $45.8 billion by PhRMA members alone.”30
Hospitals were the first organizations to meaningfully crack the medical
profession’s control over the practice of medicine. The Johns Hopkins University model
of combining medical education with clinical hospital practice and joining science
research and hospital care—precedent for the teaching hospital staple we know today—
lifted the status of hospitals immensely. 31 The resulting science advances affirmed the
union: hospitals were lifted from sanitariums where the dying were ostracized to
institutions delivering care and the potential to heal.32 The bridge between the medical
profession and hospitals, once erected, became national. Private medical schools, funded
through philanthropic donations and high tuition, were expensive and offered limited
access.33 Therefore, as the capabilities of medicine expanded, state land grant

23

STARR, supra note 15, at 115-116. See generally MARTIN KAUFMAN, AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1765-1910 (1976)
24
See STARR, supra note 15, at 102-112, 123. See generally State Requirements of Preliminary Education,
79 JAMA 658 (Aug. 19, 1922).
25
STARR, supra note 15, at 7-8.
26
Id. at 198-232.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 270-279.
29
Id. at 16.
30
PHRMA, 2010 PROFILE iv (2011).
31
STARR, supra note 15, at 112-116.
32
Id. at 150-152.
33
Hughes, Jakimo, & Malinowski, Biomedical Research, supra note 20, at 390-391; Jed Scully, The
Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of Academic Work in a Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 227, 241-42 (2004).
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universities financed their own medical schools and teaching hospitals to meet their
populations’ demand for doctors and health care needs.34
Insurers were the second category of organizations outside of the physician
community to establish a meaningful foothold of influence over the practice of medicine.
The Great Depression limited the ability of people to see and pay for doctor services,
which raised the medical profession’s responsiveness to insurance.35 However, the
major occurrence was the labor shortage during World War II. In 1942, the War Labor
Board, which prohibited private employers from paying salaries above those offered by
competitors engaged in the war effort, determined that fringe benefits up to five percent
of base wages would not be considered inflationary.36 Group hospital plans grew from
enrollment of seven million subscribers to twenty-six million and, after the war, the
popularity of employee health plans rose considerably—especially among large
employers.37 The organized labor and union movement during 1945-1959, promoted
under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, raised demand for employer-provided
health insurance coverage, and the Internal Revenue Code accommodated by making the
cost of health insurance a deduction for employers and a non-taxed benefit for
employees.38 The limits of health care relative to today made health care affordable, and
appealing during an era in which employees often were loyal and remained employed by

34

Hughes, Jakimo, & Malinowski, Biomedical Research, supra note 20, at 390-391.
STARR, supra note 15, at 232-279.
36
Id. at 311. A testament to the organization and strength of the AMA was the 1940 antitrust conviction
against it in 1940 for conspiring against an early HMO. See United States v. Am. Med. Ass'n (AMA), 110
F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert denied , 110 F.2d 703 (1940). See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, Act of
July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2008). See also Amer. Med.
Assoc. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (ruling that the practice
of medicine is trade or commerce within the meaning of the federal antitrust laws); Amer. Med. Assoc. v.
Fed Trade Com., 638 F.2d 443(2nd Cir. 1980), aff'd by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). The
courts clarified in the 1970s and 1980s that the medical profession is susceptible to anti-competition laws.
See e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (eliminating the learned professions
exemption to the federal antitrust laws); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-57
(1982) (holding that the maximum fee agreements of a state medical society, as price-fixing agreements,
are per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act). Decades later but still on the eve of the full sweep of
managed care and the commercialization of medicine, a federal court found that the AMA violated federal
antitrust laws by conspiring to eliminate the chiropractic profession. Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d
352, 360 (7th Cir. 1990). However, overall, judicial decisions and federal policy have limited the role of
antitrust laws in the reorganization of the health care sector. See generally Thomas L. Greaney, Whither
Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health Care, 21 H HEATLH AFFAIRS 185 (2000).
The medical profession has attempted to limit its exposure to antitrust liability. See Clark C. Havighurst,
The Doctors' Trust: Self-Regulation and the Law, 2 HEATLH AFFAIRS 64 (1983); Carl F. Ameringer,
Federal Antitrust Policy and Physician Discontent: Defining Moments in the Struggle for Congressional
Relief , 27 J. HEALTH POL. & L. 543 (2002). See also Sara Rosenbaum, The Impact of United States Law on
Medicine as a Profession, 289 JAMA 1546, 1552-55 (2003).
37
During this time, it was common for employees to work for a single employer for the entire duration of
their career, which was an added incentive for employers to keep them healthy. Healthcare Crisis: Who’s
at Risk? (2000) (PBS video)
38
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (“Wagner Act”), Pub.L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 151–169). STARR, supra note 15, at 310. Employer-provided health insurance continues to
be a significant health care tax subsidy that often is overlooked in discussion of U.S. health care costs.
35
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the same company for their entire careers.39 The employer-based system was reinforced
during the Cold War as the desirable alternative to socialized medicine.40 The
organization of private insurance benefited physicians. They were able to assume a
gatekeeper role, meaning that insurers and patients placed dependence on them for
reimbursement decision making, and the existence of insurance added assurance of
payment.41 During this time, physicians were able to hold onto control over institutions
and government by organizing professionally.42
As a complement to the employer-based insurance system, the U.S. government
enacted the Medicare and Medicaid programs under the Social Security Act in 1965.43
President Lyndon B. Johnson was able to get the programs approved because their scope
was limited to patching holes in the system by covering those unable to work—the
elderly and disabled—with a methodology of moving federal funds through existing
health care infrastructure.44 Physicians and hospitals welcomed the influx of additional
insured patients under the programs, and covering the elderly and disabled took pressure
off of families and had innate popularity during a time of intense social, cultural,
political, and economic change.45
The federal government made another major move into the practice of medicine
after 1962 through the addition of an efficacy requirement for FDA approval of new
pharmaceuticals.46 The thalidomide controversy was a catalyst for this elevation of the
approval standard. 47 However, the law was written to be consistent with the established
assurance that the FDA would not interfere with the practice of medicine—meaning
physician discretion over clinical use of approved pharmaceuticals would remain
respected.48 As acknowledged by Professor Evans, “During the twentieth century, FDA
pursued a policy of not regulating physicians. This was embodied in the agency’s
permissive policy on off-label use.”49
39

Who’s at Risk?, supra note 37. See Evans, Seven Pillars, infra note 46, at 460.
President Truman’s proposal for a national plan was rejected, but President Johnson credited him in the
context of passage of the Medicare and Medicaid plans. See Who’s at Risk?
41
STARR, supra note 15, at 28.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 369. Who’s at Risk?, supra note 37.
44
Who’s at Risk?, supra note 37.
45
ECOCOMIC EVENTS, IDEAS, AND POLICIES: THE 1960S AND AFTER (Eds. George L. Perry & James Tobin,
2000).
46
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 102, 76 Stat. at 781-82 (amendment to 21 U.S.C. 355(d)
to make lack of substantial evidence of efficacy a ground for denial of drug applications). The agency did
not begin requiring all drug manufacturers to submit new drug applications until 1962. Barbara J. Evans,
Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic ACT Enters the Genomics
Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 419, 423 (2010).
47
PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW14 (3rd ed.
2007); JAMES T. O’REILLY, 1 FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. § 13:2 (2011).
48
See infra notes 49, 95-98 and the accompanying text. See also Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug
Puberty?, supra note 16, at n.235 and in the accompanying text (quoting former FDA Commissioner
Kessler regarding FDAMA).
49
See Evans, Pillars, supra note 46, at 509; infra note 98 and accompanying text. The House Report that
accompanied FDAMA, enacted in 1997, expressly states that “FDA has no authority to regulate how
physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their medical practice. Physicians prescribing off40
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The AMA had welcomed establishment of the predecessor of the FDA, the Bureau of
Chemistry, in 1908-1909 to further its cause of capturing control over the flow of medical
information, including information about pharmaceuticals.50 The higher standard for
drug approval augmented dependence upon physicians for clinical research and use of
prescription pharmaceuticals. Drug makers worked even closer with the medical
profession to expand their market presence, and that relationship has continued and
strengthened.51
As illustrated by the U.S. experience with the pill,52 the 1970s marked the
beginning of decades of escalading involvement in the practice of medicine by
institutions outside of the physician community. In an environment of strong social
reform movements, from college sit-ins to riots with fatalities, liberal critics of the U.S.
health care system drove for more state intervention, which in turn augmented the
involvement of employers, the insurance industry, and the federal government.53 From
the 1970s to the present, a health care rights movement has questioned the medical
profession about informed consent,54 other human subject protects,55 patient involvement
in therapeutic decision making,56 the rights of patients to refuse treatment,57 the right of

label uses of approved drugs is not within the jurisdiction of the FDA.” H.R.Rep. No. 105-310, at 60
(1997).
50
The roots of today’s FDA date back to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, though that law addressed
only the most egregious fake drugs. See O’REILLY, supra note 47, at § 3:3 (The Food and Drug
Administration: A Brief History); STARR, supra note 15, at 131. The predecessor of today’s FDA, the
Bureau of Chemistry, was funded in 1909 with a budget of just $685,460. STARR, supra note 15, at 129.
The AMA’s efforts between 1900 and 1910 were threefold:
First, and perhaps most important, muckraking journalists and other Progressives joined
physicians in a crusade for regulation of patent medicines as part of a more general assault on
deceptive business practices. Second, as a result of its growing membership, the AMA finally
acquired the financial resources to create its own regulatory apparatus and to mount a major effort
against the nostrum makers [drugs with undisclosed ingredients]. And, third, the drug makers
were forced to recognize that they depended increasingly on doctors to market their drugs because
of the public’s increased reliance on professional opinion in decisions about medication.
Id. In 1905, the AMA closed its journal to patent medicine advertisements and established a Council on
Pharmacy and Chemistry to set drug standards and evaluate them. Id.
51
See generally HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 47. See infra note 112 and accompanying text
(physician and pharmaceutical interests joined forces to challenge off-label marketing provisions of
FDAMA).
52
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
53
STARR, supra note 15, at 388.
54
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, established by the National Research Act of
1974 (Pub. L. 93-348), addressed the controversy and issued the Belmont Report in 1979, available at
http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih9/bioethics/guide/teacher/Mod5_Belmont.pdf , which
makes voluntary, informed consent (“respect for persons”) its cornerstone tenet.
55
See the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 46; FDA 21 CFR Parts 50, 56 (FDA human subject protections).
For more information about the protection of human subjects, visit the Internet site of the Office for Human
Research Protections (OHRP), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
56
See generally KATZ, supra note 3; Wolf, supra note 4.
57
See Cruzon v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan ,70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647 (NJ 1976)..
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patients to see medical records,58 freedom from genetic discrimination,59 DNA
ownership,60 and other issues, culminating a call for comprehensive national health care
reform.61
The medical profession also fractured internally, with fissures apparent even in
the 1960s—especially between academic medicine and private practice, as the voice of
the former grew in strength and influence.62 The profession and the delivery of care had
exploded in size from 1950-1970 to become one of the U.S.’s largest industries. 63
During these two decades, the medical workforce more than tripled in size—from 1.2 to
3.9 million individuals—and national health care expenditure increased more than
fivefold, from $12.7 billion (4.5 percent of GNP in 1950) to $71.6 billion (7.3 percent of
GNP). 64 This growth promoted professional organizations on the state and regional levels
and specialty-centered professional organizations—all of which made it more difficult for
the AMA to address controversial issues and for the physician community to speak with a
single voice.65
By the 1980s, insurers, employers, and patients became frustrated with rising
health care costs under a fee-for-service system that invited physicians to perform
procedures and conduct tests well beyond patients’ actual health care needs, and to
engage in all out fraud and abuse.66 A managed care movement swept through the
nation, and the U.S. entered and era of intense commercialization of medicine. 67 In the
early 1980s, Paul Starr recognized the movement and its future scope:
More recently, the system has begun to slip from [physician] control as power has
moved away from the organized profession toward complexes of medical schools
and hospitals, financing and regulatory agencies, health insurance companies

58

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (P.L.104-191) [HIPAA].
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008 (P.L. 110-233),
60
See, e.g., The Ass'n For Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, __ F.3d ___
(C.A.Fed. (N.Y.),2011), available at 2011 WL 3211513. But see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2006).
61
See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (to
be codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). For
details about the reform, see generally PWC REPORT, supra note 5.
62
STARR, supra note 15, at 335; id. at 378 (“As the institutional side of medicine expanded, the medical
profession itself became more divided, especially between academic medicine and private practice. The
cohesiveness of the profession, so vital to its past successes, was beginning, like so many other things in the
1960s, to come apart. New interests emerged inside medicine that began to overshadow the private
practitioners. And as public dissatisfaction increased with rising costs, these new forces threatened to
reduce the sovereignty that private doctors had long exercised over medical care.”).
63
Id. at 335.
64
Id.
65
See generally supra note 36 and accompanying text.
66
See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and the Advent of a
New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 Am. J. L. & MED. 335, 335-360 (1996 symposium), reprinted in TAKING
th
SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL BIOETHICAL ISSUES (Carol Levine ed., 7 ed., 1997).
67
Id.
59
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prepaid health plans, and health care chains, conglomerates, holding companies
and other corporations.68
Solo practitioners have been swallowed up by health care networks and the rest of
the commercial establishment as predicted, and commercialization has weakened patient
trust and helped to fuel consumer-driven medicine.69 The AIDS epidemic and the advent
of information technology in the 1980s-1990s inspired information exchange among
patients, at times globally, and patient group organization and advocacy, which rages
on.70 Pervasive direct-to-consumer marketing and internet information on
pharmaceuticals has inspired patients to demand rather than simply receive prescriptions
from physicians and, due to the frequency of job and employer insurance carrier changes,
patients are switching primary care physicians with tremendous frequency. The world of
doctor and patient still is too silent, especially with time pressures imposed by the
commercialization of medicine, but patients are much more vocal, inquisitive, and
cautious.
The U.S. now has moved into a new era which underscores the need question law
and policy shaped by norms based upon what was the practice of medicine.
Governments, federal and state, are taking much more control over the practice of
medicine—most notably through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA).71 The Act, though supported by the AMA, has greatly fractured its
members.72 Though PPACA is being challenged in federal courts and the national debt
raised questions about financial feasibility, states have and are working on
comprehensive reforms. Some states, such as Massachusetts, took action years ago.
B. DRUG TREATMENT: DISEASE SYMPTOMS, NOT CAUSES
Human health has improved immensely through the progress of drug development
since the middle of the 20th century and largely due to pharmaceutical R&D.73 As
reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), “During the 20th
century, life expectancy at birth among U.S. residents increased by 62%, from 47.3 years
68

STARR, supra note 15, at 7-8. Id. at 369.
See generally Symposium—Patient-Centered, supra note 5.
70
See generally Malinowski, Capitation, supra note 66.
71
See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (to
be codified as amended in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.);
PWC REPORT, supra note 5.
72
AMA Fractured, Leftists on Top, Private Doctors Say (June 20, 2011) (the AMA House of Delegates
affirmed support in a vote of 326-165); Robert Lowes, AMA Supports Latest Health Care Reform
Legislation With Reservations, MEDSCAPE TODAY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/718909 (last viewed Mar. 9, 2011). Interestingly, the AMA ended
up generally endorsing the Act though in most of the country there are few too few doctors to absorb the
more than 40 million insured patients the Act calls for. This is a major concern in Louisiana with a
disproportionately large poor and uninsured population and a preexisting shortage of physicians since being
struck by hurricanes Rita and Katrina. Presentation by Catherine Kitchen, Director of Policy, Department
of Health and Hospitals, Louisiana State University Law Center, Health Law Survey (Apr. 2011). A
possible solution considered by some states is to grant authorities traditionally held only by licensed M.D.s
to other health care professionals, thereby diluting the traditional hold of physicians significantly. Id.
73
GRATZER, CURE, supra note 5, at 143. See generally STARR, supra note 15.
69
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in 1900 to 76.8 in 2000, and unprecedented improvements in population health status
were observed at every stage of life.”74 Vaccines have made a profound impact on the
prevention of disease: they now prevent and in some cases control (polio and measles,
for example) an impressive portfolio of seriously debilitating and life-threatening
diseases.75 Advances in the treatment of disease have been equally impressive: “Think
of antibiotics that stop infection; beta-blockers that reduce heart attach mortality by a
third; antihypertensives that prevent heart attacks in the first place; and the chemo agents
that helped Lance Armstrong.”76 These accomplishments have enabled the
pharmaceutical sector to remain the most profitable one in the U.S. for over half a
century.77 Moreover, for decades, the tendency of U.S. patients has been to believe in
prescription medications as the means to overcome their afflictions, and the general
public assimilates medicine closely with science—especially when grappling with a
seriously debilitating illness.78
Nevertheless, relative to the elevation of science standards over the last few decades
through the genomics revolution, overall, 20th Century drug development was a crude
undertaking.79 Drug sponsors were not even required to obtain an official market
approval for market access until 1962.80 Congress directed the FDA to require evidence
of efficacy as well as safety and to engage in risk-benefit decision making.81 Prior to the
74

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States,
2001-2010 (2011), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6019a5.htm?s_cid=mm6019a5_w. For an excellent
discussion of diminishing returns in drug development, see generally Rising Expectations—And
Diminishing Returns, in EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 60, at 3-25.
75
See generally Centennial Video, Center for Biotechnology Evaluation and Research (2002) (made
publicly available; on file with author). For identification of vaccine preventable diseases, see Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccines and Preventable Diseases, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd-vac/default.htm (last visited June 12, 2011).
76
GRATZER, CURE, supra note 5, at 143. See generally GROOPMAN, supra note 2.
77
See generally ANGELL, TRUTH, supra note 7.
78
GRATZER, CURE, supra note 5, at 143.
79
Symposium, Proceedings of “The Genomics Revolution? Science, Law, and Policy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1143 (2005). As observed by Professor Epstein, “it is hard to return the pharmaceutical industry to its glory
days of fifty or sixty years ago. In the interim we have gathered all the low-hanging fruit.” EPSTEIN,
OVERDOSE, supra note 60, at 239. See Rising Expectations—And Diminishing Returns, in id. at 3-25.
80
Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 423: “It was after 1962 that `FDA became responsible for making
benefit-risk decisions’ about drugs. Congress directed FDA, for the first time, to require `substantial
evidence’ of efficacy as well as safety. FDA interpreted this language to require the familiar three-phase
clinical trial process through which drugs now pass before FDA approval.” Drug Amendments of 1962
(Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C.). HUTT,
MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 47, at 434-435. Vioxx Story, supra note 7, at 365. See generally See
generally Jeffrey P. Braff, et al., Patient-Tailored Medicine Part One: The Impact of Race and Genetics on
Medicine, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. LAW 1 (2008); Jeffrey P. Braff, et al., Patient-Tailored Medicine, Part
Two: Personalized Medicine and the Legal Landscape, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 7 (2009). See also
David Classen, Medication Safety: Moving from Illusion to Reality, 289 JAMA 1154, 1154-56 (2003).
Harris Meyer, Medicine: Costly Stamp of Approval, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at p. 3, available at 2010
WLNR 1055167. Sponsors have been required to demonstrations safety since 1938. Id.
81
See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, section 102, 76 Stat. at 781-782. See also INST. OF
MED., UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PHARMACEUTICALS 48 (Leslie Pray rapporteur, 2007);
Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 423.
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1990s, the medicinal treatment of all human ailments consisted of heavy reliance on a
mere 1,200 commercial pharmaceuticals derived from 483 drug targets (compounds that
serve as the basis for medicinal applications).82 “[D]rug discovery essentially was a
linear process based upon screening and testing of thousands of chemicals and natural
substances for potential therapeutic activity. Screening was time consuming and largely
random because drug targets and drug functions were in most cases unknown.”83
The traditional drug development process developed in the 20th century centers on
taking away disease symptoms, not understanding and treating disease causes.84
Compounds are introduced into living organisms for observation to discern their impact,
potential medicinal utilities are ascertained, new drug candidates are developed and
purified through the drug approval process to control toxicity and perfect dosage for at
least one medicinal use.85 The baseline standard for market approval is to outperform a
placebo (a sugar pill, meaning essentially nothing) on efficacy, perhaps just by a
percentage point or two, with a showing of tolerable safety in a defined population.86
Pharmaceuticals approved by the FDA are introduced onto the market with the
expectation that physicians will experiment further through off-label uses while
practicing medicine on patients, and thereby identify additional clinical utilities.87
Though drug development has shifted in the direction of genetic precision
(understanding disease pathways and the importance of genetic expression),88 the
82

Jürgen Drews, Drug Discovery: A Historical Perspective, 287 SCIENCE 1960, 1960-64 (2000)
[hereinafter Drews]. Thomas Reiss, Drug Discovery of the Future: The Implications of the Human
Genome Project, 19 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 496, 496-99 (Dec. 2001); Michael J. Malinowski,
Respecting, Rather than Reacting to, Race in Basic Biomedical Research: A Response to Professors
Caulfield and Mwaria, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1489, 1492 (2009). A Drug target is “a molecular structure
(chemically definable by at least a molecular mass) that will undergo a specific interaction with chemicals
that we call drugs because they are administered to treat or diagnose a disease. The interaction has a
connection with the clinical effect(s).” Id. (page nos. not available online). Peter Imming, Christian
Sinning, & Achim Meyer, Drugs, Their Targets, and the Nature and Number of Drug Targets, 5 Nature
Reviews Drug Discovery 821-824 (Oct. 2006) (page nos. not available online),available at
http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v5/n10/full/nrd2132.html (last visited June 21, 2009). “This
surprisingly low number of targets illustrates that the identification of clinically relevant and interesting
targets was the primary bottleneck of the drug discovery process.” Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note
80, at 11.
83
Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note 80, at 11, citing Press Release, Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug
Dev., Backgrounder: How New Drugs Move Through the Development and Approval Process (Nov. 2001),
available at csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=4; and Jim Gilbert, Preston Henske &
Ashish Singh, Rebuilding Big Pharma's Business Model, 21 BUS. & MED. REP. 1 (Nov. 2003), available at
www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Marketing/rebuilding_big_pharma.pdf.
84
Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at III.A.
85
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 47, at 467-834.
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21 C.F.R. pts 301-369. See also Vioxx Story, supra note 7, at 365.
87
See Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 56 (D.D.C.1998) vacated in part on other
grounds, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.Cir.2000) (observing that “off-label use of FDA-approved drugs by physicians
is an established aspect of the modern practice of medicine”); Malinowski & Gautreux, Drug Puberty?,
supra note 16, at nn. 17-20 and accompanying text.
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See generally infra Part III.B; PERSONALIZED MEDICINE COALITION, THE CASE FOR PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE 1, 4 (Nov. 2006), available at
www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/communications/TheCaseforPersonalizedMedicine_ 11_13.pdf
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regulatory standard for market approval of a drug candidate in the U.S. remains largely
the same: elimination of symptoms, even if just marginally more effectively than a
placebo, coupled with a showing that adverse events and other safety issues across the
target disease population are tolerable given the benefits.89 Industry sponsors hold broad
discretion to tailor clinical research and to apply (or not) for approval of specific uses in
applications for market access, which provides an incentive to limit the scope of
applications for market access, get approval, and then exploit physician off label use
through sponsorship of research and conferences and the distribution of medical journal
publications. 90
III.

TODAY’S DRUG DELIVERY OVERDOSE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Life science and medicine have changed fundamentally since the days of Marcus
Welby, M.D.91 The traditional approach to drug development—heavy reliance on
physician-patient use, on and off-label, to develop meaningful understanding of
pharmaceuticals—must be modified to address the realities of contemporary health care
and biopharmaceutical R&D. As addressed below, from the perspectives of both
delivery of care and drug development, the traditional approach simply is not working,
and adhering to it is imposing an opportunity cost to human health as well as an
economic cost to the biopharmaceutical sectors.
A. DRUG DELIVERY OVERDOSE
The medical profession supported the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 and
expansion of federal regulation of prescription pharmaceuticals throughout much of the
20th Century.92 The Drug Act was consistent with the AMA’s campaign against the sale
(last visited May 6, 2011); Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note 80, at 16-17. See also Evans, Seven
Pillars, supra note 46, at Part IV.A (anticipated clinical care uptake of genetic screens).
89
See 21 C.F.R. pts 301-369; A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 126
(Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 2d ed. 2002); Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra
note 16, at 54-55 and in the accompanying text. Cf. John, Vioxx; supra note 54; Braff, Patient-Tailored
One, supra note 80, at 9 (“Nonetheless, not until the second half of the twentieth century has much
attention been paid to drug safety and, even then, adverse drug reactions were considered part of the
practice of medicine.”); David Classen, Medication Safety: Moving from Illusion to Reality, 289 JAMA
1154, 1154-56 (2003).
90
Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (C.A.D.C. 2000). Off-label use of
pharmaceuticals is “generally accepted” in the medical community and commonly practiced. See
Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 56 (D.D.C.1998) vacated in part on other
grounds, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.Cir.2000) (observing that “off-label use of FDA-approved drugs by physicians
is an established aspect of the modern practice of medicine”); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm.,
531 U.S. 341, 349, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 1018, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001).
91
TUROW, PLAYING DOCTOR, supra note 10, at 143.
92
STARR, supra note 15, at 128-134. The Biologics Control Act of 1902 arguably is the baseline for what
has become the regulation of contemporary biopharmaceuticals and established the predecessor for the
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) within the FDA. CBER, Centennial, supra note 75
(video documentary released by CBER). The 1901 deaths of 13 children from tetanus attributable to
contaminated diphtheria antitoxin inspired the legislation. National Institutes of Health, A Short History of
the National Institutes of Health, available at http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_03.html
(last visited June 27, 2011). For the expansion of regulatory authority over pharmaceuticals, see infra notes
46-47 and accompanying text.
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of snake oils (fabricated medicines, often dangerous to human health), and creation of a
market gatekeeper for prescription medicines gave the AMA much more control over the
flow of medical information and created dependence on the physician community for
clinical research and patient use of pharmaceuticals.93 Enforcement was expanded during
the 1960s to instill an application and approval process for all new drugs as a prerequisite
for market access and to impose an efficacy standard.94
Although the AMA welcomed a government gate keeper for the pharmaceutical
market, it did so with the condition that the FDA would not interfere with the practice of
medicine—meaning physician discretion over clinical use of approved pharmaceuticals
would remain respected.95 This caveat has been codified in law and reinforced over
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In 1905, the AMA closed its Journal to advertisements for medicines under patent protection and
established a Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry to set standards for drugs, evaluate them, and ensure
their utility—an effort by the AMA to directly control information over pharmaceuticals from their
manufacturers. STARR, supra note supra note 15, at 129-131. The AMA even set up a laboratory that
collaborated with the federal Bureau of Chemistry to test food and drug law products. Id. at 131.
Enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906 established a national base for what would become the
FDA, though this legislation only addressed the most egregious drug fakes. The legislation was
implemented by the federal Bureau of Chemistry, a predecessor to the FDA . The Bureau was renamed the
Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration in 1927, which was shortened to the Food and Drug
Administration in 1930. JAMES T. O’REILLY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
ch. 3, nn. 18-19 (2011). The Division of Biologics Control was established in 1937, followed by what has
become the core FDA legislation, the Food and Drug Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397, and the
Public Health Services Act of 1944 (“PHSA”) of 1944, 42 U.S.C. § 262. The Food. Drug & Cosmetics
(FD&C) act was passed in response to the 1937 deaths of 105 patients poisoned by the antibiotic
Sulfanilamide formulated with diethylene glycol. See P.M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the
1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 6 ANN INTERN MED. 456-61 (Mar. 15, 1995). Subsequently,
legislation was enacted to address medical devices: the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); and the hMedical
Device Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-300, 106 Stat. 239 (codified in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).Cross reference. Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics
Past—Present, and Future?, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 125, 180 (2003). The AMA’s efforts between 1900 and
1910 were threefold:
First, and perhaps most important, muckraking journalists and other Progressives joined
physicians in a crusade for regulation of patent medicines as part of a more general assault on
deceptive business practices. Second, as a result of its growing membership, the AMA finally
acquired the financial resources to create its own regulatory apparatus and to mount a major effort
against the nostrum makers. And, third, the drug makers were forced to recognize that they
depended increasingly on doctors to market their drugs because of the public’s increased reliance
on professional opinion in decisions about medication.” 1905: AMA closed its journal to patent
medicine advertisements and established a Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry to set drug
standards and evaluate them.
STARR, supra note 15, 129.
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1962 amendments to FDCA: Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76
Stat. 780 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).; S Re. No. 1744 at 2920-21. STARR,
supra note 15, 131-133. Evans, Pillars, supra note 46, at 501.
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See generally Marc A. Rodwin, Drug Advertising, Continuing Medical Education, and Physician
Prescribing: A Historical Review and Reform Proposal, 38 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 807, 807 (2010).
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time,96 including in conjunction with enactment of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 2007.97 As explained by Professor Evans,98
During the twentieth century, FDA pursued a policy of not regulating physicians.
This was embodied in the agency’s permissive policy on off-label use. This
policy let physicians choose to disregard instructions and warnings in drug
labeling. FDA took the position that “labeling is not intended either to preclude
the physician from using his best judgment in the interest of his patient, or to
impose liability if he does not follow the package insert.” This policy made a
certain amount of sense under the 1962 regulatory paradigm, which focused
FDA’s attention on average safety and efficacy. Unable to provide meaningful
guidance about individual safety and efficacy, FDA left this determination to
physicians.
The legacy of physician discretion over the use of pharmaceuticals continues.
Once drugs reach the market, the medical community may exercise its broad discretion to
use them off-label, and it does so aggressively.99 Prescription uses without supportive
clinical data are commonplace in all areas of medicine, but even more frequent in some
medical areas such as oncology and pediatrics.100 Pediatric data is insufficient, at times
96

See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2000) (medical device regulation); 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000) (“Nothing in
[Medicare] shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or
control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.”); Legal Status
of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs: Prescribing Uses Unapproved by the Food and Drug
Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503, 16,504 (Aug. 15, 1972) (to be codified at 21 CFR pt. 130) (“[I]t is
clear that Congress did not intend the [FDA] to regulate or interfere with the practice of medicine ....”);
FTC v. Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697, 706-07 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d 708, 717 (9th Cir.
1976). See also Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at 108, 235, and in the
accompanying text; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 717, 720, 731-2 (2005); Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 397-98 (2002) (off label use is particularly
aggressive in some medical specialties, including oncology specialties).
97
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off-label uses of approved drugs is not within the jurisdiction of the FDA.” H.R.Rep. No. 105-310, at 60
(1997).As for legal challenges, in 2000 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (“FDAMA”) provisions addressing manufacturer
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Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 509 (internal citations omitted).
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.” Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Do Off-label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy
Requirements? A Critical Analysis of Physicians' Argumentation for Initial Efficacy, 67 AM. J. ECON. &
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wholly lacking, for two-thirds of prescription drugs.101 Even with extensive off-label use,
children often are the last to receive innovative new drugs due to a dearth of clinical
data.102 The FDA attempted to force pediatric studies, but it was sued successfully by a
collaboration between the physician community and pharmaceutical sector.103
Physician choice to use prescription medications to treat any health ailment
regardless of the data submitted to the FDA for market approval was functional and to
some extent necessary during much of the last century.104 Throughout most of that time,
the entire prescription drug arsenal to treat all human illness consisted of several hundred
pharmaceuticals developed from a few hundred compounds,105 and the limit of science
capabilities restricted the scope of clinical research that was practicable.106 Health care
needs coupled with limited science understanding invited physician ingenuity in treating
patients. The FDA itself was undeveloped in function and funded miserly given its
responsibilities after the new drug application and efficacy standard requirements were
introduced in the 1960s.107 Also, there was healthy distance between the medical
profession and pharmaceutical sector through the medical profession’s independence and
influence, patient deference to physician decision making, and the limited mass media
reach of the drug industry. Pharmaceutical marketing was contained by the FDA as the
agency evolved and exercised more authority in the 1970s, and prior to the first
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) in 1992 and the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act in 1997 (FDAMA).108 PDUFA established a user fee system in which
industry negotiated with Congress and the FDA and agreed to pay user fees for
application review. FDAMA, negotiated in conjunction with PDUFA renewal, increased
FDA transparency and accountability and expanded the FDA’s mission to work with
industry to increase efficiency and bring new drugs to market quicker—especially
innovative new drugs for untreated or insufficiently treated life-threatening or seriously

authors, “Most cancer and AIDS patients are given drugs that are not FDA certified for the prescribed use.
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prescription.” Klein & Tabarrok, Off-label, supra note 100, at 743. See also Kristal M. Wicks, Exhausted
or Unlicensed: Can Field-of-Use Restrictions in Biotech License Agreements Still Prevent Off-Label Use
Promotion After Quanta Computer?, 9 U. N.H. L. REV. 157, 163 (2010); Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug
Puberty?, supra note 16, at 236-251 and the accompanying text (addressing pediatric exclusivity).
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See 63 Fed.Reg. at 66,632. See Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at 232.
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Association of American Physicians and Surgeons Inc., et al, v. United States Food and Drug
Administration, 226 F.Supp.2d 204 (Oct. 17, 2002), 2002 WL 31323411 (D.D.C.); Hearings on Better
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act at 4 (2002) (statement of Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care-Public
Health Issues). See Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, at 241-241. Congress enacted legislation to
create the means for the FDA to get desired pediatric studies done directly, regardless of industry support.
See infra notes 212-218 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The inventory of prescription pharmaceuticals used routinely
did not reach 1,200 until the 1980s. The number of overall approvals is much higher, however. See Evans,
Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 428-429.
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STARR, supra note 15, at 135.
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The FDA did not even require new drug applications until 1962, following by a showing of efficacy.
See supra notes 46, 80, 99 and the accompanying text.
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See supra notes 1-2 and the accompanying text.
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life-debilitating conditions.109 During the 1990s, industry joined forces with patient
groups to support increases in government (NIH) funding of basic research and to
demand that the FDA work faster to bring new drugs to market.110
The medical profession has lost much of its independence and most of its 20th
century control over the flow of pharmaceutical information. 111 Rather than working
with the government to filter pharmaceutical information, in recent years, the medical
profession and biopharmaceutical sectors have joined forces to check the FDA’s
authority over the market dissemination of information about new drugs. Most notable is
the Washington Legal Foundation litigation, which resulted in a federal appellate court
ruling that the FDAMA provision to place quality controls on drug maker dissemination
of journal articles promoting off-label use violated commercial free speech and was
unconstitutional. 112 Drug manufacturers, though prohibited from directly marketing offlabel uses of their prescription drugs, now are able to fund journals and sponsor research
to generate favorable publications, and to disseminate resulting articles to doctors to
encourage unapproved uses of their drugs.113 The biopharmaceutical sectors have
managed to position themselves well through armies of sales representatives and
aggressive sales tactics, 114 direct-to-consumer marketing in an age of consumer-driven
109

James L. Zelenay, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration
Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 261, 295 (2005) (“PDUFA II [,
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D. Zalesky, Considering Changes to CMS's National Coverage Decision Process: Applying Lessons
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(2002).
110
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The AMA closed its own journal to advertisements for medicines under patent protection and invited the
FDA as a mechanism for control. STARR, supra note 15, at 129.
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Washington Legal Foundation v. Henne y, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (C.A.D.C. 2000). Off-label use of
pharmaceuticals is “generally accepted” in the medical community and commonly practiced. See
Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 56 (D.D.C.1998) vacated in part on other
grounds, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.Cir.2000) (observing that “off-label use of FDA-approved drugs by physicians
is an established aspect of the modern practice of medicine”); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm.,
531 U.S. 341, 349, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 1018, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001).
113
See generally See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: ACTION STEPS
FOR CONGRESS (2006) [hereinafter “IOM Report”]. Kristal M. Wicks, Exhausted or Unlicensed: Can
Field-of-Use Restrictions in Biotech License Agreements Still Prevent Off-Label Use Promotion After
Quanta Computer?, 9 U. N.H. L. REV. 157, 164 (2010).
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Www.bio.org. Www.phrma.org. See generally Rodwin, Drug Advertising, supra note 95, at 807;
Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 96. See also , GRATZER, supra note 5, at 145 (“This book is not an
unqualified defense of pharmaceutical companies. I am certainly ambivalent about several industry
practices: the drug dinners that mix education with advertising and wine, the highly paid drug reps, the
skewed studies. I meet with drug reps periodically—I need the free samples to help my patients—and I
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medicine,115 sponsorship of continuing medical education programs, collaboration under
trade organizations such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
and the Biotechnology Industry Organization, and direct lobbying. The complexities of
contemporary life science have raised the medical community’s dependence on the drug
industry for information, especially under time constraints associated with the
commercialization of medicine.116 U.S. patients have faith in new treatments, including
experimental ones.117
The organization and expansion of patient groups, encouraged under the U.S.
pluralistic legal system and empowered 1990s information technology progress, have
become another force promoting new drug approvals and an ally of the
biopharmaceutical sectors in new drug development.118 The very mission of the FDA
was changed under FDAMA to work with industry to increase its efficiency, and the
agency has two decades of experience collecting user fees from drug sponsors to pay the
salaries of those who review their applications.119 While industry and the FDA have
solidified relations, drug sponsors have reduced their dependence on the American
medical profession for its clinical research by turning to contract research organizations
(“CROs”), private companies with global reach in the business of conducting clinical
research, and moving much of it abroad.120 The FDA also has made ongoing clinical
115

See generally Symposium—Patient-Centered, supra note 5. See also Wolf, supra note 4, at 496 (“The
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honoring the patient’s wish is her death.”); id. at 499 (“Physicians in practice are less and less surprised to
see patients arrive for an office visit having researched their illness and toting internet printouts.”).
116
As explained by Dr. Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
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Era of Genomics, 298 JAMA 1682, 1682-84 (2007).
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Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), Pub.L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296
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research transparent to the general public through www.clinicaltrials.gov, further
reducing dependence on the medical community.
B. DRUG UNDERDEVELOPMENT
In spite of tremendous annual increases in drug funding by industry and
government over the last few decades,121 major advances in science including completion
of a map of the human genome,122 and modernization of the Food and Drug
Administration in 1997,123 the U.S. drug review and approval system with heavy
dependence on physician off-label use is no longer working.124 “[T]here is substantial
proof that the current method of creating medicines for the general public is problematic
research. For many medical researchers working in resource-poor countries, ethical decision-making is like
sailing in the days before modern navigation; one is never quite sure where one is, or in what direction one
is headed." Daniel W. Fitzgerald & Angela Wasunna, Away from Exploitation and Towards Engagement:
An Ethical Compass for Medical Researchers Working in Resource-Poor Countries, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 559, 559 (2005). See also Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Balance: Finding an
Abundance of Subjects and Lack of Oversight Abroad, Big Drug Companies Test Offshore to Speed
Products to Market, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000, at A1. See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Ethics in a
Global Pharmaceutical Environment, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 57, 70-71 (2006); Jennifer M. Gold &
David M. Studdert, Clinical Trials Registries: A Reform that is Past Due, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 811
(2005) (proposing establishment of a conclusive registry for clinical trials conducted abroad); Nagano,
supra note 120 (“A sign of the trend: In August, Princeton, N.J.-based Covance CVD, the largest U.S.
CRO, struck a deal with Eli Lilly to buy Lilly's R&D labs in Indiana for $50 million. The deal will transfer
260 Lilly employees to Covance. Lilly also guaranteed Covance a 10-year business contract worth $1.6
billion.”).
121
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Pharmaceutical Law & Policy, White Paper, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment &
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for Genome Research Unveiled, Apr. 14, 2003, available at genome.gov. (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). “Ten
years after President Bill Clinton announced that the first draft of the human genome was complete,
medicine has yet to see any large part of the promised benefits.” Nicholas Wade, A Decade Later, Gene
Map Yields Few New Cures, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2010, at 1, 22. The transition could take many years—
decades according to some commentators. See generally Braff, supra note 80.
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See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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“Unfortunately, present reality is that drug development lingers between the scientifically crude, yet
enormously profitable pharmaceutical past and the biopharmaceutical present and future.” Malinowski &
Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at __ (proposing that the FDA adopt single subject research
methodology to accompany its reliance on group design in human clinical research). See also Michael J.
Malinowski & Grant G. Gautreaux, All that is Gold Does Not Glitter in Human Clinical Research: A LawPolicy Proposal to Brighten the Global “Gold Standard” for Drug Research and Development, CORNELL
J. INT’L LAW (forthcoming) (proposing international adoption of SSRD in human clinical research and
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generally ANGELL, supra note 7.
98; Peter Jennings, Bitter Medicine: Pills Profit, and the Public Health (2002) (ABC News); FDA,
INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL
PRODUCTS (March 2004), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/CriticalPathOpportunitiesReports
/ucm077262.htm.
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and could prevent effective treatments from reaching the marketplace . . .”125 As
observed by Dr. Francis Collins, head of the National Institutes of health, “[T]he drug
industry’s research productivity has been declining for 15 years, `and it certainly doesn’t
show any signs of turning upward’…”126 The industry produced just eighteen new drugs
in 2007, the lowest number in a quarter of century, twenty-four in 2008, and twenty-six in
2009.127 Pfizer Inc., the world’s largest research-based pharmaceutical company, did not
produce a single new drug approval in 2010.128 In comparison, new drug approvals
peaked in 1996 when the FDA approved fifty-three.129
Moreover, several drugs the FDA has put on the market over the last decade have
raised questions about the Agency’s judgment, effectiveness, and reliability to the point
of having aroused Congressional action,130 generated scathing reports from the
Government Accountability Office and the Institute of Medicine,131 and inspired class
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action litigation.132 The public has lost confidence in the FDA, and for good reason.133
The FDA withdrew ten drugs for safety concerns between 2000 and March 2006, 134 and
“It has been estimated that as many as half of all new drugs have at least one serious
adverse effect that is unknown at the time of drug approval.”135 Vioxx is probably the
agency’s most notorious mistake—“a ‘scarlet letter’ the FDA is likely to wear for years
to come.”136 In the fall of 2010, the FDA itself “concluded that in some cases two types
of drugs that were supposed to be preventing serious medical problems were, in fact,
causing them.”137 One was Avandia, which was prescribed heavily to treat type-2
diabetes. An association was made between Avandia and an increased risk of heart
attacks and strokes—a serious problem for the target patient group given that two-thirds
of diabetics die of heart problems.138 The second was bisphosphonates—an active agent
in the prescription drugs Fosamax, Actonel and Boniva, which were prescribed
frequently to prevent fractures common in people with osteoporosis. Bisphosphonates,
prescribed to prevent bone loss, was determined to actually cause thigh bone fractures
and jawbone degeneration.139 In addition, in 2009 it was determined that Acutane, on the
market since 1982, subjected an entire generation of teenagers who were prescribed the
drug to treat severe acne to increased risks for inflammatory bowel disease, ulcerative
colitis, Crohn’s disease, other gastrointestinal disorders, liver damage, birth defects, and
132
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suicidal thoughts. Roche, the manufacturer, pulled Acutane from the market on June 29,
2009.140
Many commercial drug developers and their supporters attribute the drop-off in
new drug approvals to over-regulation by the FDA and other government entities.141
Others attribute the fall to an industry that is clinging to the low science and regulatory
standards of the past, making bad and expensive decisions based upon these low
standards,142 stretching the commercial lives of pharmaceuticals through manipulation of
the patent system, and contriving “me too” drugs rather engaging in genuine
innovation.143 The Vioxx controversy did force the agency to raise its level of scrutiny,
including more toxicology studies and now measures to comply with the FDAAA.144
A factor contributing to the drug industry’s underperformance is that, subsequent
to enactment of FDAMA in 1997 (again, drug approvals peaked in 1996), the FDA has
been relying even more on market experience for meaningful clinical understanding of
140
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accompanying text (FDAAA).
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pharmaceuticals and off-label physician use for drug discovery. Specifically, under
FDAMA, the FDA lowered its approval standard by switching its presumption in favor of
safety—erring on the side of safety since—to one that favors approval on the condition of
Phase IV studies under section 506B of FDAMA, often referred to as 506B studies. 145
The intention is good and consistent with the efficiency element of the FDA’s mission
infused by FDAMA: make new drugs available to patients who need them as quickly as
possible.146 The problem is that the FDA has not been enforcing these post-market study
conditions.147 Once on the market, the new drug not fully understood becomes an offlabel prescription option.
Folding pharmaceuticals into the context of the overall practice of medicine raises
more issues. Medicine remains much more art than science:
Even today, with a high-tech health-care system that costs the nation $2 trillion a
year, there is little or no evidence that many widely used treatments and procedures
actually work better than various cheaper alternatives. . . . And while there has been
progress in recent years, most of these physicians say the portion of medicine that has
been proven effective is still outrageously low—in the range of 20% to 25%.148
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POSTMARKET SAFETY, BUT ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED (NOV. 9, 2009). According to the GAO, the
FDA has allowed drugs to stay on the market even when follow-up studies showed they did not save lives.
See GAO, POSTMARKET SAFETY, supra note 161. Although more than one-third of these conditional
studies are pending, the FDA never has pulled a drug from the market because of a failure to do required
follow-up about actual benefits—even when the information is more than a decade overdue. For example,
Shire Laboratories has failed to complete a study for ProAmatine, a medication for low blood pressure, for
more than 13 years. See id. This failure is consistent with GAO and IOM declarations that the FDA’s
performance post drug approval is substandard. GAO REPORT, supra note 146; IOM REPORT, supra note
146.
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Carey, Medical Guesswork, supra note 6 (page nos. unavailable online), 2006 WLNR 8974827
(reporting on the movement for evidence-based medicine). See generally ANGELL, TRUTH, supra note 7.
An important study released in 1995, confirming studies based upon autopsies done before, indicated that

26

Inviting the practicing physician community to experiment with new pharmaceuticals offlabel and, especially in the case of pharmaceuticals that reach the market under 506B, to
work out the clinical safety and efficacy of drugs over time, patient-by-patient , “exposes
patients to potentially harmful drug interactions and delays potentially effective or the
‘right’ treatment.”149 At most, only one-third of prescription medicines act as expected
when prescribed to patients.150 Adverse drug reactions cause more than 100,000 deaths
and more than two million hospitalizations annually in the US—meaning that more
people in the U.S. die from legal use of prescription medications than from automobile
accidents.151
The crude science past of just taking away symptoms is fading into the history of
drug development. Genomics (genetic expression) already has a strong presence in the
drug development pipeline; scientists are “working at the cellular, genetic, and molecular
levels in living organisms to identify genetic expression, to reveal the origins and
progression of disease, and to make connections between the two and develop drugs

15 percent of all diagnoses are inaccurate, and the advent of genomics has made the practice of medicine
more complicated since then. GROOPMAN,THINK, supra note 2, at 24. As explained by Dr. Groopman,
Clinical algorithms can be useful for run-of-the-mill diagnosis and treatment—distinguishing strep
throat from viral pharyngitis, for example. But they quickly fall apart when a doctor needs to
think outside their boxes, when symptoms are vague, or multiple and confusing, or when test
results are inexact. In such cases—the kinds of cases where we most need a discerning doctor—
algorithms discourage physicians from thinking independently and creatively. Instead of
expanding a doctor’s thinking, they can constrain it.
***
Medicine is, at its core, an uncertain science.
GROOPMAN, supra note 2, at 5, 7 (2008).
149
Need to shift single subject from delivery of care to drug development: Braff, Patient-Tailored One,
supra note 80, at 28.
150
See generally IOM REPORT, supra note 113. See Bd. on Health Care Servs., Inst. of Med., Preventing
Medication Errors 5 (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2006) (estimating a minimum of 1.5 million preventable
medication errors per year in hospitals, nursing homes, and ambulatory care settings in the United States).
See also Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note 80, at 9, 16-17. Efficacy failure may be as high as 60% of
prescriptions. Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 498. In the words of some thoughtful observers, “To
some extent, clinical medicine always has been tailored to the patient in that each physician-patient
relationship is unique, and each clinical encounter represents the physician's attempt to provide the optimal
care to the patient in the examining room, the emergency room, the hospital bed, and the intensive care
unit.” Wylie Burke & Bruce M. Psaty, Personalized Medicine in the Era of Genomics, 298 JAMA 1682,
1682-84 (2007). However, as much attention is laced on the patient, adverse drug reactions have been
accepted as part of the practice of medicine. David Classen, Medication Safety: Moving from Illusion to
Reality, 289 JAMA 1154, 1154-56 (2003); Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note 80, at 9. Negative
outcomes may result both from errors in prescribing and dispensing, and from individuals' adverse
reactions to the drugs THEMSELVES. See Petra A. Thurmann, Prescribing Errors Resulting in Adverse Drug
Events: How Can They Be Prevented?, 5 EXPERT OPINION ON DRUG SAFETY 489, 489- 93 (2006). The
varied rates of metabolizing drugs among individuals probably is a significant factor. See Kathryn A.
Phillips et al., Potential Role of Pharmacogenomics in Reducing Adverse Drug Reactions: A Systematic
Review, 286 JAMA 2270, 2270-79 (2001).
151
Barkur Sriram Shastry, Pharmacogenetics and the Concept of Individualized Medicine, 6
PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 16, 16-21 (2006).
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based upon those connections.”152 Although the underlying science has shifted in the
direction of genetic precision over the last few decades, law-policy norms and standards
have not evolved in a commensurate fashion: “Under the present law-policy scheme,
drug review is too lenient, practical understanding of new pharmaceuticals is too limited,
and market approval invites excessive off-label use—an approach that muddles clinical
care with clinical research excessively, and exacerbates the unpredictability of
prescription medications.”153
In addition to its nature, how drug development science is done has changed
intrinsically over the last few decades. Contemporary drug development necessitates
collaboration among government, academia and industry—often collaboration among
competitors—and vast commercial investment.154 In the words of one observer, U.S.
law and policy that promotes the commercialization of government-funded basic research
“has turned universities into commercial entities, created a multibillion-dollar industry of
technology transfer, and subsidized virtually every biotechnology company and discovery
of the past twenty-five years.”155 Commercialization necessitates strong intellectual
property protection, which has detonated an explosion of material transfer and
confidentiality and disclosure agreements and shrouded science in secrecy to the
detriment of the public nature of science that was the governing academic research norm
during the decades before.156 Also, “The science publications depended upon for scrutiny,
accountability, and human health assessment too have embraced commercialization—
evident by conflicts of interest controversies and the journals’ imposition of high cost
barriers to access their publications.” 157 Moreover, industry has augmented its influence
over both government and the general public expansively during the last few decades—
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See Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at __ (forthcoming). See also Evans,
Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 462-468. See generally 000 Genomes Project: Press Release, International
Consortium Announces the 1000 Genomes Project, available http://www.1000genomes.org/, last visited
May 4, 2009 (international consortium formed to research genetic variation); Braff, supra note 80; Ctr. for
Genetics Educ., The Human Genetic Code--The Human Genome Project and Beyond (2007), available at
www.genetics.com.au/pdf/factsheets/fs24.pdf (noting diagnosis and predictive testing for genetic
conditions); Peter Imming, Christian Sinning, & Achim Meyer, Drugs, Their Targets, and the Nature and
Number of Drug Targets, 5 Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 821-824 (Oct. 2006) (page nos. not available
online), available at http://www.nature.com/nrd/journal/v5/n10/full/nrd2132.html (last visited June 21,
2009. See generally, Genomics Revolution?, supra note 79, at 1-143.
153
Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at __ (forthcoming). See generally
Malinowski & Gautreaux, Gold Does Not Glitter, supra note 124.
154
“Remaining at the forefront of technology is innate to universities' combined missions of teaching,
research, and service”, meaning that integration among academic, industry and government in biomedicine
was inevitable. See Hughes, Jakimo, & Malinowski, supra note 20, at 399.
155
See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 42 HOUS.
L. REV. 1373, 1375, 1378 (2007). For another evaluation of Bayh-Dole, see David C. Mowery, Richard R.
Nelson,Bhaven Smpat & Arvids Ziedonis, IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: U.S. UNIVERISTYINDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOHL ACT (2004).
156
“Aggressive integration of academia and industry has created a proliferation of conflicts of interest, and
the public nature of science—collegiality, communication, transparency, and accountability—has shifted in
the direction of secrecy.” Malinowski, Drug Puberty?, supra note 20, at text accompanying n167.
157
Id. at text accompanying note 168.
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the former over its lobbying presence,158 user fees paid to finance the FDA review of its
products,159 and alliances with patient groups and the medical profession,160 and the latter
through aggressive direct-to-consumer marketing.161 Secrecy prevails, reliability of the
peer review mechanism is unreliable, and the integrity of research is subject to
question:162
The vast capacity to publish research and to share knowledge is tainted by
conflicts of interest which threaten the reliability and integrity of the peer review
process and, consequently, the underlying research. Governments, professional
societies, and most science journals have failed to introduce the mechanisms
necessary to manage conflicts of interest in an era of aggressive
commercialization with meaningful confidence.
Arguably, “government interventions are necessary to protect and preserve the public
nature of science, which is essential to shore up the contemporary science enterprise.”163
Both Congress and the current administration are concerned enough about the
state of drug development to take action. The Obama Administration has announced
formation of a new center, funded with a billion dollars, to help private industry develop
new drugs under the direction of Francis Collins, the present Director of NIH and leader
of the government effort to map the human genome. 164 Congress enacted the Food and
Drug Administration Amendment Act of 2007 (FDAAA)165 —“the most momentous shift
in drug regulation in half a century.”166 Under the FDAAA, premarket clinical studies
are augmented and evidentiary standards demand culling more data from them, but their
limitations also are recognized. FDAAA calls for the FDA to establish an expansive
postmarket risk identification and analysis Internet-based system, known as the Sentinal
Nework, to disseminate risk information to patients and health care providers in an
ongoing manner.167
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The PDUFA legislation and user fee system are addressed infra in notes 108-110, 119, and the
accompanying text. Commentators have estimated that there are as many as four lobbyists working in
Washington, DC on behalf of the pharmaceutical sector for every member of Congress. Who’s Sick in
America?, 20/20, ABC News (2006); ANGELL, supra note 7. Seee generally Thomas, Vioxx Story, supra
note , at 365.
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See supra notes 110, 118 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 8, 119 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 5, 115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
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See generally Malinowski, Discourse, supra note 20, at 2-24.
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Id. at 23.
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See Gardiner Harris, New Federal Research Center Will Help Develop Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2011, at A1.
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Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 423. See generally id.; Barbara J. Evans, Authority of the Food
and Drug Administration to Require Data Access and Control Use Rights in the Sentinel Data Network, 65
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 67 (2010).
167
FDAAA, § 915, 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(r) (West Supp. 2009). See generally FDA, The Sentinel Initiative :
An Update on FDA’s Progress in Building a National Electronic System for Monitoring the Postmarket
Safety of FDA-Approved Drugs and Other Medical Products (July 2010), available at
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IV.

A LAW-POLICY PRESCRIPTION

The practice of medicine and drug R&D have changed immensely over the last half
century,168 but excessive physician discretion to prescribe medications off label lingers
on—to the detriment of drug innovation and human health.169 The Institute of Medicine,
the Government Accountability Office, the National Institutes of Health, and Congress
have recognized this prescription drug dilemma—culminating in the FDAAA and the
new billion-dollar government research center that will attempt to resurrect drug research
abandoned by industry.170 Physician autonomy, including discretion to prescribe drugs
off label, dates back to the establishment of the drug application approval requirement in
the 1960s,171 and the two complemented each other for decades.172 Times have changed:
broad discretion to prescribe off label is inconsistent with the reality of contemporary
drug development and the delivery of health care.173
Although science is shifting in the direction of genetic precision, the drug
development pipeline is lengthy and winding, and the transition is ongoing and
incomplete.174 Some element of physician discretion to prescribe off-label is necessary
during the evolution of drug development science into the genomics era, but the historic
level invites a race to the bottom—both in medicine and drug development.175 The
standard for delivery of care must be modified and the regulatory standard for new drug
approvals must be raised so that more drug discovery is shifted from clinical care to
clinical research. Variables driving the need for this law-policy change include
contemporary science capabilities, the proliferation of adverse drug events, drug
ineffectiveness, the need to choose among treatment options, the increasing complexity
of biopharmaceuticals, health care cost pressures, and the vulnerability of patients—
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/FDAsSentinelInitiative/UCM233360.pdf (last visited July 17, 2011);
Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46; Evans, FDA Authority, supra note 166.
168
See generally STARR, supra note 15; GROOPMAN, supra note 2.
169
See supra Part III.
170
See supra notes 130 and accompanying text (FDAAA); 113 (IOM REPORT); 131 (GAO REPORT).
171
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
172
See generally supra Part III.. See Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 502. As explained by Professor
Evans,
To ensure individual efficacy, the agency seemingly would need a mechanism for enforcing
physicians' compliance with its approved product labeling. In 1962, Congress was unwilling to
assert that federal jurisdiction extended that far. In fairness, Congress's decision did not
significantly diminish public health or safety: The science of that day would not have supported
meaningful regulation of individual effects, even if Congress had been comfortable with the
jurisdictional issues it presented.
Id.
173
Id. at 504-505 (cross-labeling to couple genetic screens with drugs) . See generally supra Part III.
174
See generally Braff, Patient-Tailored One, supra note 80; Braff,, Patient-Tailored Two, supra note 80;
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY (2008), available at
http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/. For information about the biopharmaceutical sectors, visit the
Internet sites of the industries’ trade organization, PhRMA, www.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).; BIO,
www.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). Both drug developers and physicians have demonstrated hesitation
towards pharmacogenomics. See generally Woodcock, Pharmacogenomic Data, supra note 116; Moe,
Pharmacogenomics, supra note 116.
175
See supra Part III.
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seekers of care, not research participants under the scrutiny of regulations to protect
human subjects.176
Several trends suggest that such law-policy change is inevitable, and that drug
sponsors should expect more scrutiny and demands for accountability from regulators,
the medical community, and the general public. These trends include rising health care
finance pressures, federal and state, domestic and international;177 increased transparency
of market performance and market behavior through internet communication, including
organized observation through patient and consumer protection groups; and pressure on
the FDA to increase post-marketing regulation requirements and general enforcement.178
However, given the extent to which physician discretion over use of prescription
pharmaceuticals is entrenched in the legislation enabling the FDA179 and has been
affirmed and assured repeatedly, including in the enactment of FDAMA,180
comprehensive direct limitations on physician discretion to prescribe off-label would
require an expansive law-policy intervention and invite legal challenges.181 Any such
proposal would trigger united opposition from the physician community and the
biopharmaceutical sectors with their expansive lobbying resources.182 Similarly, using
the regulatory process to attempt to impose commercial uses on new drug candidates or
specific types of human clinical trials on drug developers would invite allegations of
undue impediment on the commercial freedom that is the touchstone of our private
market system and introduce susceptibility to legal challenges.183
176

See the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 46; FDA 21 CFR Parts 50, 56 (FDA human subject protections).
For more information about the protection of human subjects, visit the Internet site of the Office for Human
Research Protections (OHRP), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
177
See generally PWC REPORT, supra note 5.
178
See FDA, STAGNATION?, supra note 124.
179
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
180
The House Report that accompanied FDAMA expressly states that “FDA has no authority to regulate
how physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their medical practice. Physicians prescribing
off-label uses of approved drugs is not within the jurisdiction of the FDA.” H.R.Rep. No. 105-310, at 60
(1997).
181
“The drug development regulatory regime embodies deference to commercial free speech, proprietary
interests, profit incentives, and the discretion to practice medicine—as the FDA has been reminded by
Congress and through several legal challenges during the genomics revolution.” Malinowski & Gautreaux,
Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at __ (forthcoming). For example, the biopharmaceutical sectors and
physician community joined forces to successfully challenge the efforts of the FDA to regulate two
pharmaceutical strategies to promote off-label use—dissemination of science publications to physicians
(referred to as “enduring materials”), and continuing medical education (CME) programs for doctors that
profile off-label uses. See generally Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (C.A.D.C.
2000). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined that the relevant FDAMA provisions
imposed an undue burden on commercial free speech in violation of the First Amendment. See id. at __.
Also, in 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in that federal law does not prohibit Oregon doctors from
prescribing lethal doses of drugs, thereby striking down a key challenge to the Death with Dignity Act.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 54 U.S. 243 (2006).
182
See supra note 158 (industry lobbying resources); Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 181.
183
Cf. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 60. See, e.g., Association of American Physicians and Surgeons
Inc., et al, v. United States Food and Drug Administration, 226 F.Supp.2d 204 (Oct. 17, 2002), 2002 WL
31323411 (D.D.C.). See infra note 103 and the accompanying text (challenge to FDA rules proposing
mandatory pediatric trials). However, in recent years, Congress did succeed in banning a medical
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There are several more viable law-policy options, each of which is addressed below.
The first is to fully utilize the FDAAA to generate earlier and more complete information
about new drugs under direct FDA oversight. This approach, coupled with greater FDA
enforcement of existing market checks and utilization of the added market control
mechanisms introduced by the FDAAA, would leave physicians with less off-label
discretion. Another option is to raise the technical clinical trial science standard for drug
approval and post-market clinical trials to generate more information about drugs through
the regulatory process. This added information would be fodder to raise the drug
approval standard and utilize market use restrictions, including those under the FDAAA,
which would force drug sponsors to rely less on off-label use and marketing. Given that
market return drives the commercial biopharmaceutical sectors, another option is to
condition reimbursement for off-label uses of pharmaceuticals under Medicare and
Medicaid, in the health insurance plans covering federal employees, and through national
health care reform.
A. RAISE THE SCIENCE STANDARD
The biopharmaceutical sectors have the resources and capabilities to meet a higher
science standard in clinical research. Although the profits of yesterday’s investors will
not pay for today’s and tomorrow’s drug development, the pharmaceutical industry has
been the most profitable sector for well over a half century, and today’s
biopharmaceutical sectors have tremendous resources and invest tens of billions in drug
R&D annually.184 In fact, arguably adhering to a science standard that is too low is
wasting their vast resources through poor decision making, failures, class action
litigation, and lost opportunities in drug development.185 Moreover, although drug
developers spend tens of millions of dollars on research, they spend more on marketing—
and much of that to encourage physicians to exercise their discretion to use their drugs
off label.186
The imposition of a higher science standard in clinical research could be a means to
raise the level of discovery in premarket drug development and deliver drugs to market
with more direction and less physician off-label discretion. The low hanging fruit in drug
development is gone, science is much more complicated, and a more rigorous science
standard for clinical research is needed to reach higher.187 Approaches could center on

procedure, partial birth abortion, based upon its assessment that the procedure was not medically necessary.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003).
184
ANGELL, TRUTH, supra note 7, at 135-172.
185
See Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at __ (forthcoming). For discussion of
industry’s investment in drug development and difficulties producing in recent years, see supra Part III.B.
186
ANGELL, TRUTH, supra note 7, at 135-172. Much drug marketing is to encourage the medical
community to exercise its discretion to use their products off-label. Harris Meyer, Medicine: Costly Stamp
of Approval, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at p. 3, available at 2010 WLNR055167. Acccording to an FDA
estimate, almost two percent of all prescription drugs are directly marketed without its approval, meaning
illegally. Harris Meyer, Medicine: Costly Stamp of Approval, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at p. 3, available
at 2010 WLNR055167.
187
EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 60.
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the scope of clinical research required, a content-driven standard for human clinical
research, or a combination of the two.
Congress has recognized the drug underdevelopment problem and has mandated a
higher science standard through the FDAAA, but its solution is to do more with the same
technical human clinical trials methodology.188 The core methodology of the FDAAA,
still to be fully implemented, is to expand clinical studies before market approval and to
extensively augment market data collection from and dissemination of information to
physicians through Sentinel, an expansive data collection and dissemination system
among the FDA, physicians, and patients.189 A plain reading of the FDAAA, which
opens many possibilities subject to implementation,190 is a level of acceptance of the
limitations of the clinical trial process that puts drugs on the market, though the FDAAA
will expand that process,191 and belief that drawing more information from the physicianpatient experience into the regulatory process with enhanced FDA market presence will
shore up the reliability of prescription drugs.192 To juxtapose the present with the
FDAAA future, the core FDAAA approach calls for more of the same in clinical trials
before the FDAAA,193 and essentially pushes physicians and their patients even more into
a research mode outside the scope of regulations to protect human subjects.194 To
establish the Sentinel network and achieving the extensive physician participation the
approach is premised upon is a lofty, arguably unrealistic, goal in the foreseeable future,
especially given the discretion allotted physicians over prescription drugs, federal and
state medical privacy laws, and the proprietary nature of the information at issue, and
cost.195 As explained by Professor Evans,196
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Technical science methodology for clinical trials is addressed in Malinowski & Gautreaux, supra note
16, at Part II.A.
189
See supra notes 189, 195-200 and the accompanying text.
190
See infra notes 188-198 and the accompanying text.
191
Congress has attempted to shift traditional Phase IV trials into premarket studies through the FDAAA.
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see generally
Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46. Phase IV studies have been largely observational and centered on
post-marketing surveillance to detect and define previously unknown or inadequately quantified adverse
reactions and related risk factors. Post-marketing surveillance is sometimes referred to as “Phase V” trials.
See Jaime Aldes, The FDA Clinical Trial Process: Effectuating Change in the Regulatory Framework
Governing Clinical Trials to Account for the Historical Shift from “Traditional” to “New” Phase I Trials,
18 HEALTH MATRIX 463, 472 (2008) (“Phase V trials monitor the effects of the drugs as reported by
physicians, survey data, and discover new uses for the drug.”). In recent years, they often have
distinguished defined demographic groups that may have been overlooked as a focus point during the trials
that put the drugs on the market. See generally Braff, Personalized Medicine Part II, supra note 80.
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See generally Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46; Evans, Authority, supra note 166.
193
Increasing the scope of human clinical trials exponentially over the last five years has resulted in less,
not more, drug approvals, and clinical trial desperation has exploded the scope and cost of Phase III trials.
See generally Nagano, supra note 20. See also Malinowski & Gauteaux, Methodology, supra note 16, at
73-77 and the accompanying text.
194
Increasing the scope of human clinical trials exponentially over the last five years has resulted in less,
not more, drug approvals. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
195
See generally Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 496. See also Barbara J. Evans, Congress’ New
Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585 (2009) (discussing FDA reliance
on voluntary regulatory compliance in the context of FDAAA regulatory infrastructure).
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Frankly, the concern is not whether FDA will over-share access to Sentinel data.
The concern is that FDA may fail to ensure the level of access Congress
envisioned. In recent years FDA has tended to favor a consensual model of
regulation, a sort of regulation by consent of the regulated, and has shown a
certain reluctance to flex compulsory power.
The provisions of the FDAAA that call for the FDA to pull more discovery into
the premarket approval process and then approve market use with many more conditions
on physician use is not consistent with the known realities of drug discovery and
delivery—which depends heavily on learning from the physician-patient experience.197
She also approaches the FDAAA with thoughtful practicality and raises numerous
considerations about the implementation of Sentinel.198 A fundamental weakness in the
FDAAA is that its Sentinel approach assumes a metamorphosis in the culture of the
practice of medicine—a change in entrenched norms that make broad off-label discretion
dangerous to human health. In sum, the vast majority of practicing physicians are not
clinical researchers, and the disciplines are wholly distinguishable when it comes to
handling information. As explained by Dr. Davit Gratzer, the Sentinel approach works
well in theory,199 however there is a strong reality to overcome:200
Doctors are reluctant to take the time to fill out lengthy drug safety reports. Some
have estimated that under 1 percent of adverse events are reported by doctors.
Indeed, the FDA has so little confidence in safety information coming from
physicians’ offices that they have a full-time staff whose job it is to read medical
journals for letters about drug reactions, figuring that doctors are actually more
likely to write to a journal than to the FDA. Meanwhile, drug companies seem to
do the opposite, flooding the FDA with any and every possible adverse reaction,
burying significant events in a graveyard of data. This over-reporting creates
distracting noise. On top of this, the FDA largely doesn’t monitor post-approval
side effects anyway.

196

Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 496. See also Evans, New Infrastructural, supra note 195, at
585 (discussing FDA reliance on voluntary regulatory compliance in the context of FDAAA regulatory
infrastructure).
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See generally Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46; Evans, Authority, supra note 166. However,
Professor Evans does challenge the off-label norm as an antiquated hold-over from last century. See Evans,
Seven Pillars, supra note 46, at 509.
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See generally Evans, Seven Pillars, supra note 46; Evans, Authority, supra note 166.
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GRATZER, supra note 5, at 158. Dr. Gratzer acknowledges that doctors do not report about
pharmaceuticals, but he still proposed that heightened electronic surveillance could improve drug delivery:
If a new drug is launched that has a certain rare toxicity to the liver, a real-time surveillance
network might eventually be able to detect subtle elevations in the liver enzyme tests of patients
who were started on the drug and also happened to have blood work done around the same time.
If enough of these signals were detected, it might alert the FDA that there is a potential liver
toxicity and allow the agency to intervene before real harm is done to any patients.
Id.
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Id.
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Another reality is that the FDA’s technical science standard for human clinical
trial research is too low, which causes seconding guessing by the agency in the
marketplace and failure in the context of aggressive drug sponsor marketing to excessive
physician discretion.201 As explained by Dr. Gratzer,
In other words, despite the extraordinary caution of the FDA, it’s difficult to tell
exactly how a drug affects people until it hits pharmacies. Bromfenac is a case in
point. No problems had been discovered by the original clinical trials, involving
2,500 people. The analgesic was withdrawn after causing four deaths and
necessitating eight liver transplants –but the medication was taken by 2.5 million
people.202
The FDA could raise its technical science standard by complementing the global gold
standard for clinical research, group design (GD), with a single subject research design
methodology (SSRD):203
GD is based in randomized, parallel, group trials. While GD typically focuses on
ascertaining statistically significant variations based upon group averages, the core
SSRD methodology is to repeat comparisons of control and treatment conditions with
the same individual or staggered across similar individuals, graph the data on a
subject-by-subject basis, and analyze the results. Thus, the individual serves as her
own control while the variables interacting between the individual and the
environment are isolated.
GD depends “upon mathematical abstracts that, although representative of the group
collectively, may say nothing decisive about members of the group individually, let alone
broad populations of patients with health care needs outside the group.”204 As explained
by Dr. Gratzer: 205
Call it the post-Vioxx conventional wisdom: the belief that approval standards must
201

See generally Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16.
GRATZER, supra note 5, at 157.
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See generally Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16. This SSRD proposal was
introduced and fully discussed in Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16. The discussion
was extended to propose international adoption of SSRD in human clinical research through the
International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH)—an advisory body for drug harmonization for the
European Union (EU) through the European Medicines Agency (EMA), the US through the FDA, and
Japan through the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, and industry leadership in each market. See
generally Malinowski & Gautreaux, Global Gold, supra note 124. For information about ICH, visit its
official web site, http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html (last visited July 2010). The ICH
recognizes GD as the global gold standard for human clinical research. See generally International
Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) in E9 Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials. ICH issued E9 in 1998
to harmonize statistical methodologies used to support marketing applications. ICH Guidance Examines
Statistical Principles to Support Clinical Research, GUIDE TO GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE NEWSLETTER
(Nov. 1998); 63 FED. REG. 49583-49597 (Sept. 16, 1998). ICH Michael J. Malinowski, Ethics in a Global
Pharmaceutical Environment, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 57, 70-71 (2006).
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Malinowski & Gautreaux, Drug Puberty?, supra note 16, at __ (forthcoming).
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GRATZER, supra note 5, at 156-157.
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be toughened up to ensure that America’s drugs are safe. Indeed, many demand that
the FDA require more clinical trials on greater number of participants, with the logic
that the system has failed spectacularly so we should embrace the system more
zealously. Here’s the FDA’s dirty little secret: clinical trials involve a relatively
homogenous group of healthy individuals who collectively are totally
unrepresentative of the people who actually take pharmaceuticals. The FDA doesn’t
need to raise the bar higher, it needs to rethink drug safety.
Abstracts based on group averages put drugs on the market, “But, in fact, few if any
physicians work with this mathematical paradigm. The physical examination begins with
the first visual impression in the waiting room, and with the tactile feedback gained by
shaking a person’s hand. Hypotheses about the diagnosis come to a doctor’s mind even
before a word of the medical history is spoken.”206
SSRD would heighten appreciation for human variability and individuality, innate to
the practice of medicine, in the human clinical research that puts and keeps drugs on the
market. 207 A major practical advantage of SSRD over GD is that “It overcomes some of
the inherent limitations found in large-scale clinical trials, in that treatments are tailored
for unique individuals and can also be modified over time."208 SSRD could be
implemented in conjunction with FDAAA, especially through the latter’s provisions that
require much more detailed information gathering and interface with physicians for Phase
IV trials and market use.209 This union could be extremely beneficial to the practice of
medicine directly, as well as through improvements to drug development:210
Research supports the effectiveness of the single subject design, from studying
treatments for rare patient populations to providing N-of-1 trial services in
assisting physicians. The single subject design is an innovative addition to the
arsenal of available methodologies for primary care physicians, biomedical
students, residents, medical research faculty, clinical practitioners, among others.
Consistent with the NIH Roadmap Initiative, increasing awareness of the utility in
the single subject design could enhance treatment approach and evaluation both in
biomedical research and primary care settings.
SSRD would require modification of the entrenched GD gold standard and, though
the FDAAA expands the FDA’s authority to demand more clinical research as a
prerequisite for market approval, the legislation arguably is overwhelming, its
effectiveness is subject to FDA enforcement, and it still has not been fully implemented
206
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and subject to the potential court challenges that will arise.211 According to past
experience and legal precedent, the means most likely to achieve a higher science
standard for human clinical research are commercial incentives, direct government
involvement in the research, or some combination of the two.
Commercial incentive-based programs to get desired clinical research done have
proven effective and they have endured the threat of legal challenges. The most noted
examples are the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) and the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act
(BPCA).212 The FDA has successfully used ODA and BPCA to get needed clinical
research done on small disease groups and children—research that industry avoided.
ODA is a rewards-based program. The ODA methodology is to make drug development
for small groups of patients commercially viable, and the mechanisms it employs are tax
incentives, a seven-year period of market exclusivity, and other benefits.213 ODA is
working, and has been copied by other countries.214
BPCA is legislation enacted to enable the FDA to get pediatric studies done and to
recover from litigation challenging the FDA’s attempt to force them.215 The FDA
introduced an incentive-based program—pediatric studies in exchange for six months of
market exclusivity. When the FDA attempted to demand the studies for the same reword,
litigation ensued and the FDA lost.216 Congress stepped in to introduce an alternative:
funding for the FDA through a trust to get pediatric studies done on its own and
independent of commercial drug sponsors.217 BPCA has worked to the extent that more
pediatric studies are being done in spite of industry aversion to them.218
The BPCA approach of the government directly funding needed research is an
effective method for trumping legal challenges and moving science forward. The federal
government has founded a new center to help cure the drug development dilemma by
resurrecting drug development research abandoned by industry. 219 The center will be
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headed by Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the NIH and head of the U.S. Government
effort to map the human genome, and its mission is to transition the accomplishment of
the map of the human genome into human health applications.220 The scope of the center
could and should be expanded to engage in clinical research with a SSRD component.221
A major criticism of BPCA is the cost to taxpayers when the government directly
engages in clinical research in conjunction with a new drug proposal. 222 However, the
drug dilemma is costly—in terms of both human health and the U.S. economy.
Investment in SSRD to turn the clinical trial gold standard into platinum would be
justified given the enormous annual investment U.S. taxpayers make in biomedical
research through NIH and other agencies, and the importance of the success of the U.S.
biopharmaceutical R&D endeavor.223
B. UTILIZE FDAAA MECHANISMS
There are regulatory mechanisms in FDAAA that could effectively limit physician
discretion to prescribe off-label and thereby push drug developers to achieve more during
the premarket drug R&D process. Much depends upon how the FDAAA is implemented
and enforced.224 First, the extra data generated under the FDAAA, both through
expanded pre-market trials and Sentinel,225 would give the FDA the means to issue black
box warnings and to demand notice of them through the dissemination component of
Sentinel. The latter would affirm notice to physicians and potentially raise liability for
ignoring black box warnings. The FDA has been utilizing the black box mechanism
more frequently in recent years to reign in prescription pharmaceutical use, including offlabel use.226 The black box—in literal terms, a black border around a written warning—
is a visible sign that appears on package inserts for prescription drugs, which flags the
danger of serious adverse events.227 These warnings, which the FDA may impose on rug
labels or package inserts, flag that a drug carries significant risk of serious or even lifethreatening adverse effects; it is the strongest warning the FDA may issue.228 The FDA is
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much more inclined to issue black box warnings on new drugs over older ones.229 A
current estimate is that twenty percent of all drugs receive a black-box warning.230
Two other FDAAA mechanisms that could be employed to tailor existing off-label
uses are the Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) and product cross-label
provisions.231 The FDAAA grants the FDA statutory authority to condition drug sales
through REMS.232 Through the FDA’s cross-labeling authority under FDAAA, the FDA
has authority to impose pharmacogenomics (new drug market access associated with
genetic screening)—most notably given tends in the underlying drug development
science, tie new drugs with associated genetic screens.233
Collectively, these mechanisms, with an information flow from Sentinel if that is
successfully and meaningfully implemented,234 could check the 506(B) presumption in
favor of market access with substantive knowledge about drugs on the market.235
Hopefully, pushed by Congress through the FDAAA, the FDA will accomplish more
quality control.
C. CONDITION REIMBURSEMENT FOR OFF-LABEL USES
Drug development, as any other highly commercial endeavor, centers on market
return—meaning physician-patient use and reimbursement. There are mechanisms in the
established health care system to shift from traditional off-label use to use controlled by
clinical data, but mounting health care finance pressures and ongoing reform, federal and
state, open a door to a dimension of additional possibilities. There are pending legal and
finance challenges to PPACA, but the legislation has been enacted, it is expansive
(2,700+ pages) which suggests that at least some provisions will sustain legal challenges,
and states do not have the luxury of waiting to see what happens with PPACA and are
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into the process of trying to comply—meaning that health care reform, federal and state,
is underway.236
Under the established health care system, control over off-label use could be
introduced through reimbursement restrictions under Medicare and Medicaid and the
health insurance provided to federal employees. The pressures to cut health care costs
are enormous—evident in the enactment of the PPACA.237 Editing reimbursement of
off-label uses of pharmaceuticals makes sense on the levels of quality of care and cost
savings. Industry should be pressured to engage in clinical research commensurate with
actual clinical use and reimbursement. When an administration makes categorical
changes regarding health care reimbursement for federal employees, the full portfolio of
private health insurers servicing them adopts the policies and they make their way into
the general public’s policies as standard of care and coverage consistency.238
PPACA introduces two new mechanisms that could be implemented to directly
curtail off-label uses of pharmaceuticals: the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Innovation to test new ways of delivering care to patients, and an Independent Payment
Board239 to target waste in the system and recommend ways to reduce costs, improve
health outcomes, and expand access to high quality care.240 The IPAB—slated to consist
of fifteen experts, including doctors and patient advocates nominated by the President
and confirmed by the senate—is a backstop that will take effect only if Medicare costs
grow too fast.241 However, trends suggest that is inevitable.242 IPAB will make
recommendations to Congress to promote cost and quality of care, which Congress may
accept or reject.243 If Congress opts to reject and Medicare spending surpasses specific
targets (which it likely will based upon current trends),244 it must enact policies that
achieve equivalent savings or let the Secretary of Health and Human Services follow
IPAB’s recommendations. The IPAB is a wonderful opportunity to check physician offlabel use of pharmaceuticals in the absence of supportive clinical data and to promote
SSRD.
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The PPACA also establishes an Innovation Center authorized to test innovative
care and payment models.245 Congress created the Innovation Center under the
Affordable Care Act, giving the Center the authority and direction to “test innovative
payment and service delivery models to reduce program expenditures, while preserving
or enhancing the quality of care”246 for those who get Medicare, Medicaid or Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) benefits. Congress funded the Center with $10 billion
for 2011 through 2019. The goal is to raise the quality and value of care, which is in sync
with the law-policy proposals put forth in this article to edit physician discretion to use
pharmaceuticals outside the scope of the data that puts them on the market and raise the
science standard for new drug approval.

V.

CONCLUSION

Testimony before Congress about the unreliability of prescription drugs, like
testimony over the birth control pill in 1972, triggered significant law-policy change,
sweeping FDAAA legislation—though the recent testimony failed to capture the same
public attention.247 Unfortunately, the FDAAA does not break cleanly from the legacy of
excessive physician discretion to prescribe pharmaceuticals off label, meaning
prescribing drugs beyond the scope of FDA market approvals and the data that puts drugs
on the market.248 Traditional off-label discretion, a hold-over from the middle of the last
century, draws drug developers into investing resources in marketing rather than clinical
research249 and invites physicians to experiment on their patients well outside the scope
of research standards, including regulations to protect human subjects.250
A major premise of this article is that the broad off-label usage norms are
antiquated—a reflection of the crude science past in pharmaceutical R&D and
paternalism in the practice of medicine, which are not consistent with the present
consumer-driven era in medicine and contemporary genetics. This article proposes
utilizing existing mechanisms and implementing the FDAAA to limit physician off-label
discretion through a heightened regulatory standard for introducing pharmaceuticals to
patients in need of care. Patients, like the physicians writing their prescriptions, are
engaged in clinical care, not clinical research, and when subjected to prescriptions offlabel are drawn outside the scope of the clinical data putting drugs on pharmacy shelves
and regulations to protect human subjects. Today’s Dr. Marcus Welby should take fewer
liberties and demand more data.
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